Abstract We give an example from the theory of Markov decision processes which shows that the ''optimism in the face of uncertainty'' heuristics may fail to make any progress. This is due to the impossibility to falsify a belief that a (transition) probability is larger than 0. Our example shows the utility of Popper's demand of falsifiability of hypotheses in the area of artificial intelligence.
Introduction
In a Markov decision process (short MDP), an agent operates on a set of distinguishable states S. In each state the agent has a number of actions taken from a set A at her disposal. The set of available actions A may depend on the current state, but usually A is chosen to be the set of actions available in each state. According to the chosen action the agent obtains some reward. Typically this is a real number taken from some interval [0, R] . Commonly, the rewards are not deterministic but random according to probability distributions which depend on the current state and the chosen action. Further, after having chosen an action a in state s, the agent is transferred to another state according to a probability distribution depending on state s and action a. The agent starts from a fixed state (or, more generally, is randomly set to some initial state according to a given probability distribution over the set of states).
A formal definition of a Markov decision process thus may look as follows.
Definition 1 A Markov decision process (MDP) M on a finite set of states S with a finite set of actions A available in each state in S consists of (i) an initial state s 0 , or more generally an initial distribution l 0 over S, (ii) the transition probabilities p(s 0 |s, a) that specify the probability of reaching state s 0 when choosing action a in state s, and (iii) the payoff distributions with mean r(s, a) and support in [0, R] that specify the random reward for choosing action a in state s.
A (stationary) policy on an MDP M is a mapping p: S ? A, which for each state specifies the action the agent chooses. For a fixed policy the random process induced on the states (which is a Markov chain) may exhibit different behavior. In the simplest case the induced Markov chain is ergodic, that is, with positive probability each state will be visited sooner or later (with probability 1), independent of the initial state. However, there may be also transient states, which independent of the initial state will (with probability 1) be visited only a finite number of times. Finally, the set of non-transient states may be partitioned into several communicating classes such that there are no positive transition probabilities between states in different classes. In any case, the average reward of a policy p can be defined as qðM; pÞ :¼ lim where l p is the stationary distribution of the Markov chain which p induces on M: Intuitively, the stationary distribution on S indicates the probability of being in a particular state after an infinite number of steps. More precisely, for an ergodic Markov chain with transition matrix 1 P ¼ pðs; s 0 Þ ð Þ s;s 0 2S there exists a unique invariant and strictly positive distribution l p , such that independent of l 0 it holds that l 0 " P n converges to l p for n??, where "
If the Markov chain is not ergodic, l p will depend on the initial state s 0 , or more generally, the initial distribution l 0 (Kemeny et al. 1976) .
The goal of an agent operating on an MDP is to maximize her average reward, that is, to find an optimal policy p Ã such that qðM; p Ã Þ ! qðM; pÞ for all policies p. It can be shown that the achievable average reward cannot be increased by using time-dependent policies (Puterman 1994) . 1 The transition matrix P is the matrix of transition probabilities with rows and columns indexed by the states in S, so that in row s and column s 0 the entry in P is the transition probability p(s, s 0 ) from s to s 0 .
The ''Optimism in the Face of Uncertainty'' Maxim
If the MDP is known to the learner, there are various algorithms to calculate an optimal policy, such as value iteration or policy iteration (Puterman 1994) . The problem becomes more interesting if one assumes that the agent-beside her knowledge of S and A-can only observe the current state and the rewards obtained for an action. In this setting, many algorithms follow the ''optimism in the face of uncertainty'' maxim, which lets the agent act according to an overly optimistic model of the MDP with respect to the observations so far. The best example for such an algorithm is the well-known R-Max algorithm (Brafman and Tennenholz 2002) . The agent's model of the MDP assumes the maximal possible reward R for each action a in states in which a has not been probed sufficiently often. Here ''sufficiently often'' means that if all actions in all states have been visited sufficiently often, then the optimal policy with respect to the estimated MDP (i.e. the MDP whose rewards and transition probabilities are the means of the obtained rewards and observed transitions, respectively) will be (close to) optimal in the real MDP as well. The idea of the algorithm is that the agent will explore states and actions that are not known well enough (at least if it may pay off to do so). That way the optimistic model is an incentive to explore.
Two similar algorithms which refine the idea R-Max is based on are MBIE Littman 2004, 2005) and UCRL (Auer and Ortner 2006) . Here the agent assumes the most optimistic model with respect to some confidence intervals for the estimated transition probabilities and rewards.
An Example where Optimism Fails
The Example
The following example shows that the ''optimism in the face of uncertainty'' maxim may fail to find an optimal policy.
Example 1 Assume an MDP with two states s 1 and s 2 , where s 1 is the initial state. In s 1 two actions a 1 and a 2 are available, none of which however results in a transition to s 2 (cf. Fig. 1 ). Even if the two actions yield different average reward \R, any optimistic algorithm will choose a model in which there is a positive transition probability to s 2 , where the algorithm optimistically expects to yield maximal reward and the possibility to stay, i.e. r(s 2 , a) = R and p(s 2 |s 2 , a) = 1 for some action a. With this model, any algorithm will choose not the (optimal) action that gives highest reward in state s 1 , but rather the action it expects to cause a transition to s 2 . Note that it is not important how small the transition probability from s 1 to s 2 is estimated. Even the smallest positive probability results in a stationary distribution l with l(s 1 ) = 0 and l(s 2 ) = 1, so that in the long run it does not matter how much time is used to insist in the transition to s 2 .
The problem for the algorithm is that it is impossible to distinguish between a very low probability for a transition and its impossibility. Here the ''optimism in the face of uncertainty'' idea fails, as there is no way to falsify the wrong belief in a possible transition.
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This example is reminiscent of well-known cases where chess programs fail to evaluate totally blocked positions correctly (cf. Fig. 2 ). While any human chess player immediately will recognize these kind of positions to be deadly drawn (even independent of what any of the players may do in the future), programs, which usually evaluate positions according to the material distribution, do not see that there is no possibility to exploit the material advantage.
How to Avoid the Problem
How do the optimistic algorithms mentioned above deal with this problem? First, most algorithms such as MBIE Littman 2004, 2005) do not work with average but with discounted rewards, that is, at step t the expected reward the agent Fig. 2 A chess position which is drawn, as there is no possibility for White to exploit its material advantage. Note that White cannot even sacrifice material in order to break up the pawn chain 2 Note that the claim that the outcome of a random experiment has positive probability is basically an existence claim over an infinite number of trials (and hence not refutable). 3 Incidentally, this can also be used as criticism on Pascal's wager. Although it is not clear whether it is appropriate to represent Pascal's wager as an MDP similar to that in Example 1, Pascal's argument is based on a non-refutable belief, as the assumption that there is a positive transition probability to heaven is not falsifiable. receives for action a is not the full amount of r(s, a) but only c t Á r(s, a) for some discount factor c \ 1. This means that basically only a finite number of steps matter for the agent. However, in that case one may calculate for how many steps it pays off to insist in a transition which has never been observed. 4 The algorithm R-Max (Brafman and Tennenholtz 2002) avoids the problem of Example 1 basically by considering only states which have been visited sufficiently often. Further, knowledge of an MDP dependent parameter, the ereturn mixing time, is assumed. This is the time it takes until the agent's reward is e-close to the optimal average reward, when playing an optimal policy. Obviously, this parameter also indicates how small transition probabilities under an optimal policy might be.
Similarly to R-Max one may try to ignore the knowledge of the whole state space and consider only states which have been visited before. However, this meets the difficulty of transient states as the following example shows.
Example 2 Consider the same MDP as in Example 1, only that now the initial state is s 2 , in which as in s 1 the agent has two actions a 1 , a 2 at her disposal, both of which lead with probability 1 to s 1 (cf. Fig. 3) .
The agent chooses e.g. a 1 , and gets an arbitrary reward. However, the optimistic assumptions about action a 2 are the same as in Example 1, and we have the same problem.
Note that the MDPs in the examples are not ergodic. (An MDP is ergodic, if any policy reaches all states with probability 1, i.e. iff all Markov chains induced by policies are ergodic.) Actually, the problem of Examples 1 and 2 cannot occur in ergodic MDPs. Thus, e.g. the UCRL algorithm (Auer and Ortner 2006) only considers ergodic MDPs. Recently, the results of (Auer and Ortner 2006) have been generalized to communicating MDPs in which any two states can be reached from each other within a finite number of steps under some policy (Auer et al. 2008) . However, the MDPs of Examples 1 and 2 are not communicating either. 2 4 That is, for an optimistic estimate of the transition probability p in question, one computes the expected reward which may be gained when insisting in the transition. This can be compared to the reward to be expected when ignoring the transition (i.e. setting p = 0 in the agent's model). If the latter value is larger, the agent refutes the hypothesis that p [ 0. 5 It is worth noting that although the UCRL algorithm assumes that the underlying MDP is ergodic or communicating, the optimistic model of the MDP it assumes in general is neither ergodic nor communicating.
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Popper, Refutability, and the Progress of Science So far, our notion of refutation has been only intuitive. Usually, refutation means that the observations contradict the hypothesis (in a strictly logical sense). However, as we are dealing with probabilities, in our context refutation rather means that a current hypothesis is quite improbable given the observations. That is, there is a threshold for the probability of the hypothesis given the observations, which decides whether a hypothesis is kept or refuted. This is basically also what Popper had in mind for statistical hypotheses (cf. Popper 1969, Chap. VIII). Of course, in the MDP framework there is no global threshold which will work for any MDP, as transition probabilities may be arbitrarily small, so that this approach cannot give a general solution for the problems posed by Examples 1 and 2. Still, Popper's notion of refutability at least provides some explanation why the ''optimism in the face of uncertainty'' heuristics fails in these examples. For Popper refutability was on the one hand a criterion for empirical hypotheses which separates them from metaphysical hypotheses (cf. Popper 1969, Chap. IV). On the other hand, he thought that refutability of hypotheses would be a warranty for scientific progress towards truth (cf. Popper 1969, Chap. X). We think that our examples show that Popper's theory holds in the nutshell of Markov decision processes, even if the agent operating on the MDP wants to converge to optimal rather than absolute truth.
What makes refutable optimism work is that in the case where the agent's hypothesis is not refuted she is doing rather well. That's why refutable optimism is preferred to other refutable hypotheses. Unfortunately, as Examples 1 and 2 show, in some cases optimism becomes irrefutable, while then again optimism may always be given up one step too early.
